This study examines CEO compensation in U.S. financial services industry, utilizing a sample of 277 financial institutions both before and during the recent crisis. We find that, contrary to the popular portrait that bank CEOs have significantly reduced their compensation during the crisis period, some of these reductions are only window dressing. On average, both the ratio of total CEO compensation and the ratio of fixed compensation over firm value have in fact increased in 2008. Further, we document evidence consistent with the notion that CEOs switch from bonuses to other forms of pay. There is also some indication that more powerful CEOs are able to switch more than otherwise.
INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation has long been examined in the field of economics, accounting, finance and management. In standard agency theory, incentive components of executive compensation, in particular equity-based pay, are generally thought to be a useful tool in aligning executives' interests with those of the shareholders (e.g. Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1999) . However, an opposing view, managerial power theory, argues that CEOs are paid overly generously and incentive compensation (including incentive pay) are often abused by entrenched, power executives at the expense of their shareholders.
Until recently, most of empirical studies concerning executive compensation have focused on companies in non-financial industries. In the aftermath of recent financial crisis of 2007-2008, executive compensation (more specifically, CEO compensation in financial services industry) has been the subject of intense debate among regulators, the media, and the academic community. Among mostly discussed topics are whether bank CEOs are paid too much above and beyond reasonable market rates, whether their incentive contracts encouraged excessive risk-taking that almost brought down the entire U.S. financial system, and, from the public policy's point of view, whether the U.S. legislation and government should regulate executive compensation of financial firms.
On one hand, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) present some evidence that bank CEOs invest substantially in their banks, that these CEOs lost large amount of wealth on their holdings of shares and options during the crisis, and that these CEOs did not reduce their equity holdings in anticipation of the crisis. The authors argue that compensation excesses are not likely the cause of excessive risk-taking at financial firms or, in turn, the subsequent problems. Core and Guay (2010) echoed this viewpoint by presenting that, on risk-adjusted basis, U.S. bank CEOs are not paid too high or received too little incentive compensation.
Further, these authors argued against the 2009 executive compensation reform proposed by Treasury Secretary Geithner and implemented by Special Master Feinberg.
On the other hand, some scholars see excessive executive compensation as a contributing factor to the financial crisis (e.g. Rajan, 2009 ). Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010) took a detailed account of executive compensation practice in Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers over 2000-2008. They argue that top executives at both firms pocketed large amounts of performance-based compensation prior to the crisis and that total cash payoffs these executives took away were bigger than the losses suffered by their firms during the crisis.
Some of these recent studies examined bank CEO compensation data only up to 2006, the year before the financial crisis began. We argue that, in order to assess whether there is a case for regulating pay practices in the financial services industry, we need to both investigate CEOs compensation before and during the recent crisis and take into account the differences across various types of financial firms.
Compensation to CEOs of financial firms, in particular of the biggest banks, has been increasing in line with that of non-financial CEOs over the past two decades or so (Core and Guay, 2010) . Although some high pay figures of large banks stirred up media attention, these figures may indeed reflect CEOs' talent, complexity of their tasks, overall superior firm performances, and labor market demands (e.g. Core, Guay and Thomas, 2005; Kaplan, 2008) .
The issue here is to determine whether, above and beyond these forces that determine reasonable market rates, CEO compensation can be explained by proxies of CEO managerial power. Further, in the wake of the recent financial crisis, what has happened to the CEOs' pay when their firm performed poorly or even stood on the edge of collapsing; did the CEOs receive less total pay accordingly, or did they replace certain compensation that are more prone to public anger (such as cash bonuses) with something less obvious and intimidating?
With empirical analysis based on large pool of financial institutions -277 unique firms over the period of 2003-2008, we intend to address the following questions:
(1) What are the characteristic of CEO compensation in the U.S. financial services industry, both at levels and in terms of compensation structure? What factors are important to CEO compensation? Do these factors matter to the same extent before and during the crisis?
(2) There is reportedly a significant reduction in total compensation (in particular cash bonuses in 2007 and 2008), are these reductions for real? Or, are they simply a window dressing to make compensation look humble and modest? More specifically, when a CEO receives less bonus pay, how do other forms of his compensation change?
(3) If such switches from bonuses to other forms of compensation do exist, what justifies them -firm's growth, CEO risk aversion, or, do they signal issues in our corporate governance practice?
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, executive compensation in the financial services industry has attracted renewed attention from academics, policy makers, capital providers and the general public. We contribute to this relatively under-explored but growing literature by providing new evidence concerning CEO pay practice at financial firms both prior to and during the crisis period. In addition, to our knowledge, apart from handful of papers in accounting literature (Lambert et al., 1991; Anderson et al., 1999) , ours is the first empirical study that explicitly examines the possibility that, in financial services industry, executives switch among different forms of compensation. Our findings suggest that CEO compensation, relative to performance of the financial institutions they manage, indeed jumped up in 2008. Further, some CEOs do switch from cash bonuses to other forms of pay (such as fixed pay or stock options) during the crisis period.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II summarizes related literature concerning executive compensation and its association with different factors, with a particular focus on the financial services industry. Section III discusses our data, key variables and the empirical strategy we have adopted. Section IV reports our empirical findings, and we conclude with Section V.
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Our paper broadly relates to the vast literature on executive compensation and corporate governance, and more specifically to executive compensation of the financial services industry. The issue of CEO compensation has been examined in academia over the past several decades. There are two broad theoretical views concerning the role of executive compensation, in particular the incentive components. In the standard setting of agency theory, incentive compensation is typically viewed as a useful mechanism through which the board mitigates principal-agent problems. Because the executive's effort is not observable, shareholders have to rely on incentive compensation to encourage the executive to act in the best interests of his shareholders (e.g. Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Murphy, 1999  Non-equity incentive compensation (BLTIPNE) includes BONUS, LTIP, and NEIP;
 Equity incentive compensation (EQUITY) is the market value of stock awards;
 Options (OPTION) is the market/fair value of options granted;
 Total compensation (TOTAL, or TDC3) is the sum of the above four items.
In order to make assessment concerning the structure of CEO compensation, we also construct ratio variables by dividing each of the above compensation components by TOTAL.
These ratios reflect CEO compensation structure, and changes in these ratios over time indicate structural changes in pay. In order to measure the relative compensation (rather than the compensation in dollar value), we also introduce another set of ratio variables by  In group 4, investment banks, bonuses dominated the other forms of compensation prior to the crisis, and the compensation structure has changed afterward;
 In group 5, other types of financial institutions, the relative importance of shares has been increasing over time. Further, absolute level of total CEO compensation increased in 2008, at odds with the other groups.
< Figure 1 goes about here >
Key variables
The amount and structure of CEO compensation can depend on or are associated with many factors, including CEO characteristics such as his risk aversion, equity ownership in the firm and bargaining power over the board, firm-level determinants such as past firm performance and operational complexity, macro economic conditions and regulatory limits on CEO compensation or components of CEO pay.
Because shareholders cannot observe CEO effort, they (through the board) often utilize incentive compensation components such as bonuses and stock options. Compensation structure thus shapes the incentives of the CEO. At the same time, however, compensation structure is also (at least partly) influenced by the CEO. Weak corporate board and the lack of external discipline, such as takeover threat, are both related to more entrenched CEOs.
We employ two measures for CEO's power over the board. 7 First, it is widely recognized that CEO's power increases when he also serves as the chairman of the board (e.g. Yermack, 1996) . We thus define variable DUAL as an indicator that equals one when CEO duality exists, and zero otherwise. 8 Our second measure of CEO power is the managerial entrenchment index (EINDEX), which we obtained from Prof. Bebchuk's website. This index summarizes 6 anti-takeover provisions and is widely used as a composite indicator of CEO entrenchment (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2009; Bates et al., 2008) .
In terms of control variables, previous research documents that the level of compensation increases with firm size (e.g. Barro and Barro, 1990) , the use of stock-based compensation increases in growth opportunities in the firm's investment set (e.g. Smith and Watts, 1992), and the risk associated with incentive compensation increases with stock return volatility (e.g. Banker and Datar, 1989) . We thus include as independent variables the logarithm of total market capitalization (SIZE) as a proxy for firm size, logarithm of total assets (LASSET)
as an alternative proxy for firm size, market-to-book ratio (MTOB) as a proxy for growth potential, and weekly stock return volatility over the past year (RISK) as a proxy for firm risk.
Firm size and risk may both reflect the degree of complexity of the CEO's tasks. We include CEO age (AGE) and equity ownership at the beginning of the year (OWNERSHIP) in the firm as proxies for his risk aversion. Arguably, older CEOs are more risk averse and would prefer less stock-based compensation. Because different forms of incentive compensation may respond differently to alternative performance measures, we also control for firm performance that takes either one of the two measures, accounting-based return on asset (ROA) or annualized stock return (ANRET), depending on the exact compensation variable we examine. 9 We conjecture that CEOs whose firms are larger, with more growth opportunities, facing larger market risk and have performed well in the past year are more likely to receive high compensation than otherwise. We also conjecture that older CEOs and CEOs with greater existing equity ownership prefer less incentive compensation that is equity-based. To investigate what factors determine the level and structure of CEO compensation, we adopt a multiple regression framework to examine the cross sectional difference in the different components of CEO compensation. In particular;
(1)
, where the dependent variable, PAY, measures either the level of CEO compensation or the relative importance of a particular form of compensation and the independent variables are as specified in Section 3.2.
When total compensation is made up of incentive components that have different risk profiles and are linked different performance metrics, one needs to take into account the interplay between these components in analyzing compensation-performance relationship (Anderson et al., 1999) . To investigate potential substitution across different forms of compensation (i.e. the "switch"), we adopt a multivariate logistic regression as follows;
, where 1, 0, A significant coefficient, either β or γ, points to the characteristics of the firms that switch.
For example, a positively significant γ would indicate that a bank with a powerful CEO who also serves as the chairman of the board has a higher probability to replace annual bonus with other forms of compensation than a less powerful CEO.
In all models, we control for year fixed effects. 10 
IV. MAIN FINDINGS
During the financial crisis some CEOs, in particular those from large investment banks and commercial banking firms, received little bonus rewards either voluntarily or because of the enormous public pressure, 11 as confirmed in Figure 1 . The question, however, is whether CEO compensation has really gone down, in particular relative to the value of the firms that they manage? Figure 2 The main results, for the pre-crisis sub-sample, are qualitatively the same as those reported in the paper. 11 << Reference cases to be added in the text for as footnote >>. commercial banks (groups 1 and 2) before the crisis. For these commercial banks, CEO's bargaining power over the board also had more significant impact on CEO compensation before the meltdown than during the crisis. The two power measures do not seem to have consistent explanatory power concerning other types of financial institutions.
In regards to CEO bonuses and other non-equity incentive payouts (Panel 2.B-1 and Panel 2.B-2), contrary to our expectation, past firm performance has little impact on bonus rewards. Future growth potential, on the other hand, has a significantly positive impact for commercial banks before the crisis and for all types of financial firms during the meltdown.
One potential explanation is that, when the U.S. economy was in chaos in 2007-2008, stability and growth prospects became especially important for financial institutions. In terms of CEO power measures in the two commercial bank groups, again, the statistical significance disappeared during the crisis years.
We next report results on CEO options (Panel 2.C). In general, future growth opportunities have a significantly positive association with options compensation the CEO receives, both before and during the crisis. Older CEO receive somewhat less options compensation, however the effect is only significant for some types of financial institutions and only during the crisis. One interesting finding is that the amount of options a CEO is granted increases when the CEO also holds the board chairmanship. On one hand, more options could lead to better alignment between the interest of the CEO and that of his shareholders. On the other hand, more options could promote excessive risk-taking behavior. In results not tabulated for brevity, we do not find any significant association between duality and the amount of restricted shares the CEO receives.
In results concerning fixed compensation (not tabulated for brevity), firm size, stock volatility and CEO age all have significantly positive regression coefficients for commercial banking firms, supporting the argument that a CEO's salary largely reflects the complexity of his job and his risk aversion. These variables, however, are not significant for other types of financial firms. Neither measure of CEO power, duality or E-index, is significant.
< In fact, according to a survey conducted by consultancy Mercer that "some 65 percent" of the surveyed 61 banks and other financial services firms said that they had increased basic salary, while "88 percent" decreased bonus. 14 With these in mind, we next address the possibility of some CEOs switching from annual bonuses to other forms of compensation, in particular given the public outcry against overly generous bonuses in the wake of Lehman Brothers, AIG and the likes. 15 Figure 3 15 For instance, AIG recorded a $99.2 billion total loss in 2008, and its market value plummeted to $2.7 billion at the end of March 2009. The US government had to create an $85 billion credit facility in late 2008 to bail out the insurance giant in order to avoid further impact rippling through the entire financial system. In March set of pie charts regarding different forms of compensation an average CEO received before and during the financial crisis, separately for each group. In terms of proportional bonus pay, we see significant reduction in groups 1 through 3, some reduction in group 4, and little change in group 5.
< Figure 3 goes about here >
We proceed with Table 3 , a set of T-tests which keeps track of CEO compensation structure over time. There are two panels in Table 3 . < Table 3 goes about here > 2007, 43% of financial institutions in our sample involved in at least one instance of switch from bonuses to other forms of compensation. In 2008, this figure increased to 53%. Table 5 summarizes the results of Logistic regressions, Equation (2), as to what factors may be related to such switches from bonuses to other forms of compensation. In 2008, duality (measuring CEO power) seems to matter. For instance, for an average firm whose CEO is not chairman of the board, the odds of switching from bonus to equity is 0.48. All else equal, if the CEO is also a chairman of the board, the odds will change to 1.3, indicating a much higher probability of switching.
< Table 5 goes about here >
Robustness Checks
Our definition of CEO is based on "annual CEO" flag provided by ExecuComp database. We sometimes observe changing CEOs in the middle of a year, which might affect our compensation measure. We double checked our data by removing such cases (fairly small number of cases, in fact), and our main findings still hold. Thus, "changing CEO" effect is unlikely to affect our results.
V. Summary, Discussion and Conclusion
During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, U.S. financial institutions suffered huge losses. Over the same period, there were on average some declines in executive compensation in these firms, in particular in the form of cash bonuses. Some argue that, if these executives were not paid excessively to begin with and if they also suffered together with their firms, there is no legitimate case for the legislators and/or government to regulate the bankers pay. 
